原创翻译:mg电子游戏平台网 翻译:翻译熊 转载请注明出处
论坛地址:/bbs/thread-488806-1-1.html



注:全文包含正文及评论,此处放出的是正文部分,供读者免费阅览,另有一篇关于此书评的优质评论合辑,将放在平台发布,欢迎订阅。

Comprehensive and very readable overview of Chinese economy from a China expert, with especially useful discussions on Chinese SOE’s, financial system, and the validity of Chinese economic statistics (spoiler: They’re fine). Learned some interesting new things from it, despite having already read a considerable amount on this topic over the years. However, there are some rather questionable takes that prevent me from giving it a full five stars.

前言:一个中国专家对中国经济的全面而可读性强的概述,特别有用的讨论了中国国企、金融体系和中国经济统计数据的有效性(剧透:它们都很好)。尽管多年来已经阅读了大量关于这个主题的书籍,但我还是从这本书中学到了一些有趣的新东西。然而,有一些相当有问题的看法,阻止我给它一个完整的五星。

China is an emerging superpower with a nominal GDP at 70% of the US level (130% in PPP terms). The physical correlates of that are illustrated on the cover of this book – as China’s share of the urban population trebled since 1980, cities and megalopolises have sprouted on the sites of former villages (follow Carl Zha to get a a regular visual dose of such transformations). Yet even as China let go of Maoist lunacies and built up the infrastructure and productive capacity of a First World nation over a single generation, it encountered new problems – pollution, inequality, debt – that some pundits have argued will eventually derail its ascent. This book offers a comprehensive account of the story of the world’s most successful major economic growth story after the heyday of the East Asian tigers, and a more realistic background for analyzing China’s prospects.

中国是一个新兴的超级大国,名义GDP是美国的70%(按购买力平价计算为130%)。这本书的封面上说明了它们之间的物理联系——随着中国城市人口比例自1980年以来增长了两倍,城市和特大城市在旧村上如雨后春笋般涌现。然而,尽管中国在一代人的时间里摒弃了疯狂主义,建立了一个mg电子游戏平台世界国家的基础设施和生产能力,但它也遇到了一些新的问题——污染、不平等、债务——一些专家认为,这些问题最终将阻碍中国的崛起。这本书提供了一个全面的故事,世界上最成功的主要经济增长故事后的鼎盛时期的东亚四小龙,和一个更现实的背景分析中国的前景。

Interesting/Important Observations
(1) As I have argued in the past, Maoism was a disaster in economic terms – at the end of it, China had a lower GDP per capita than India, despite their human capital disparity. This is not so surprising when one learns that you had a greater chance of dying on the job than getting fired in late Maoist China (cf. “THE CHINESE ECONOMY” by Barry Naughton). It made the Soviet Gosplan look like a paragon of technocratic efficiency. So no wonder that on Mao’s death, the Politburo decided to adopt the proven East Asian developmental state model instead (based on land reform, export manufacturing, and financial repression).
But Chinese practice differed from Japanese and Korean in two key respects.
First, the state played an even more paramount role, with China relying much more on State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). In contrast, most Japanese banks and corporations were private, and while many of Korea’s banks were state-owned, the chaebols were generally private; interesting, the most state-dominated economy was Taiwan’s, where all the banks were (and still are) state-owned, and many companies were owned by the state or Guomindang (though these were mostly privatized in the 1980s to early 1990s).
Second, foreign direct investment (FDI) played a much greater role. Counter-intuitively, this was because of the East Asian tigers’ security integration with the US. In exchange, the US “tacitly allowed to run mercantilist economies, shutting out foreign companies from their markets even as their own companies enjoyed easy access to the US market.” As Kroeber argues, this was a deal that China was never going to get – “as the price of admission to the US-dominated world trading system, China would need to give foreign companies substantial market access.”


In Taiwan, the move to representative democracy was a strategic choice made by leader Chiang Ching-kuo in the 1980s in response to the US decision to normalize relations with Beijing (and hence sever formal diplomatic ties with Taipei). Chiang believed that in order for Taiwan to retain its autonomy in a region increasingly influenced by a fast-growing China, it had no choice but to align itself as fully as possible with American political and ideological values. Similarly, South Korea’s military dictatorship was tolerated by Washington during the Cold War, but would not likely have outlasted the fall of the Berlin Wall by very long, even had it not crumbled in the face of embarrassing student-worker protests ahead of the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul. By contrast, China’s position outside the US alliance structure means that it has no need to accept the liberal-democratic frxwork.
Would they have happened otherwise? And, more importantly – with China conceivably approaching military superiority in the West Pacific within another 1-2 decades and forcing the US to cede control over the region – will Japan, Korea, and Taiwan remain democracies?

“在台湾,代议制民主是领导人蒋经国在上世纪80年代做出的一项战略选择,以回应美国决定与北京实现关系正常化(并因此切断与台北的正式外交关系)。蒋经国认为,为了让台湾在一个日益受到快速发展的中国影响的地区保持自治,台湾别无选择,只能尽可能地与美国的政治和意识形态价值观保持一致。同样,美国在冷战期间也容忍了韩国的军事独裁,但即使在1988年首尔夏季奥运会之前,面对令人尴尬的学生工人抗议活动,韩国的军事独裁也不太可能比柏林墙倒塌持续更久。相比之下,中国在美国mg电子游戏平台结构之外的地位意味着,它没有必要接受自由民主框架。”(注:所有直接带引号“”的都引自书中的内容)
不然呢?
更重要的是,随着中国在未来1-2年内有望接近在西mg电子游戏平台的军事优势,并迫使美国放弃对该地区的控制,日本、韩国和台湾仍将是民主国家吗?

(2) Useful chart of China’s power system: Policy largely determined by “leading small groups” tightly lixed to the Politburo (especially under Xi Jinping) – ministries don’t have much power, are largely tasked with implementation.

中国权力体系图表: 政策很大程度上由与政治局紧密联系的“领导小团体”决定——政府部门没有太多权力,主要是执行任务。(略)

(3) Why isn’t China crushing the Hong Kong protesters under tank treads?
Another facet of the FDI strategy was that much “foreign” investment was not really foreign. Nearly half of inbound direct investment has come from Hong Kong, and while much of that may simply reflect the activities of Hong Kong–based subsidiaries of American or European firms, it is clear that Hong Kong firms have been major investors in the mainland… Moreover, as much as a third of China’s reported FDI may in fact be “round-tripping”—investments by Chinese individuals and companies that are routed through companies in other jurisdictions, especially Hong Kong.

(略)
“外国直接mg电子游戏平台战略的另一个方面是,许多“外国”mg电子游戏平台并不是真正的外国mg电子游戏平台。近一半的外来直接mg电子游戏平台来自香港,虽然其中大部分可能只是反映了美国或欧洲公司在香港的子公司的活动,但很明显,香港公司一直是中国内地的主要mg电子游戏平台者……此外,中国报告的FDI中,多达三分之一可能实际上是“双向mg电子游戏平台”——即中国个人和企业通过其它司法管辖区(尤其是香港)的企业进行的mg电子游戏平台。”



(5) More from the Annals of Maoist Lunacy:

(略)

(6) While Kroeber doesn’t make the analogy himself, he would clearly agree with Richard McGregor’s argument in THE PARTY that China’s current political economy may be best described as a Leninist/NEPist state. While it has many vigorous small companies, the “commanding heights” of the economy remain state dominated. This includes three of the ten largest companies in the world (Sinopec, CNPC, State Grid), as well as 82 of the 92 Chinese companies on the Fortune Global 500.
Comparison to Japanese and Korean industrial organization:
Chaebol are diversified conglomerates, typically controlled by a founding family. Like keiretsu, they involve extensive use of cross-shareholdings among related companies. Unlike keiretsu, they are prohibited by law from owning banks. This prohibition on bank ownership was a deliberate choice made in the 1960s by the Korean government, which wanted to make the chaebol dependent on credit from state-owned banks and hence responsive to the government’s policy obxtives. … After much experimentation, the system that evolved in China was that of the “business group” (qiye jituan). The business group was first legally defined in 1987, and over the course of the next fifteen years the central government created about two hundred such groups by corporatizing various ministries and production bureaus. …
SOE business groups typically operate within a single industrial sector. This rule is somewhat elastic and most SOE groups have a cluster of investments in sectors unrelated to their core businesses, often in property, travel services, and restaurants. But these investments are generally modest relative to the core businesses. This single-industry focus distinguishes Chinese business groups from the highly diversified Japanese and Korean conglomerates.
Over the years, the SOEs have been steadily reformed:
1. “Grasping the large, letting go of the small” (抓大放小) in 1995, that is, getting rid of the most ineffective and smallest SOEs and holding on to the largest and potentially most competitive ones.
2. Listing commercially attractive assets in a subsidiary on stock markets, while retaining lower-return investments and politically sensitive projects in an unlisted parent company.
3. Creation of State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003, which is a government shareholder in ~200 central SOE business groups.
4. There were plans – at least, as of the time of writing – to make SASAC into a purely regulatory body, and transfer ownership to a set of “asset management companies” broken down by major industry sectors (modeled after Singapore’s Temasek).
While the adjustments were occasionally painful, SOE performance did improve: “The average return on assets in state firms soared from 0.2 percent in 1998 to 5 percent in 2007.”

虽然本书mg电子游戏平台没有做这样的类比,但他显然会同意Richard McGregor在《The Party》的观点:中国目前的政治经济可以用列宁主义/新经济政策主义来做最佳描述。尽管中国有许多充满活力的小企业,但中国经济的“制高点”仍由国家主导。这包括mg电子游戏平台十大企业中的三家(中石化、中石油、国家电网),以及《财富》mg电子游戏平台500强中92家中国企业中的82家。

与日韩产业组织比较:
“财阀是多元化的企业集团,通常由创始家族控制。,它们涉及到相关公司之间交叉持股的广泛使用。但日本不同,法律禁止他们拥有银行。禁止银行所有权是韩国政府在上世纪60年代做出的慎重选择,当时韩国政府mg电子游戏平台让财阀依赖国有银行的信贷,从而对政府的政策目标做出回应……经过大量的实验,在中国发展起来的体系是“企业集团”的体系。企业集团最早是在1987年被合法定义的,在接下来的15年里,中央政府通过将多个部委和生产局公司化,创建了大约200个这样的集团。
国有企业集团通常在单一的工业部门内运作。这一规则具有一定的弹性,大多数国企集团都在与其核心业务无关的领域进行了一系列mg电子游戏平台,这些领域通常是房地产、旅游服务和餐饮业。但与核心业务相比,这些mg电子游戏平台通常规模不大。这种单一行业的专注,使中国企业集团有别于高度多元化的日本和韩国企业集团。”

多年来,国企改革稳步推进:
1. 在1995年,“抓大放小”,也就是说,摆脱最无效的和最小的国有企业
2. 让具有商业吸引力资产的子公司上市,同时保留未上市母公司的低回报mg电子游戏平台和政治敏感项目。
3. 2003年成立国有资产监督管理委员会(国资委),是约200家中央国有企业集团的政府股东。
4. 至少在撰写本文时,中国政府曾计划将国资委打造为一个纯粹的监管机构,并将所有权转让给一系列“资产管理公司”,这些“资产管理公司”按主要行业分类(仿照新加坡淡马锡)。
尽管调整偶尔会带来痛苦,但国企的业绩确实有所改善:“国企的平均资产回报率从1998年的0.2%飙升至2007年的5%。”

(7) While state ownership in Russia is high relative to the West – even once dirigiste France – it’s nothing out of the ordinary relative to BRICS, as well as South Korea (which I have argued is Russia’s closest analogue in East Asia). Meanwhile, China is clearly the most state-dominated.

尽管俄罗斯的国家所有权相对于西方来说很高——甚至一度实行中央集权的法国也是如此——但相对于金砖四国以及韩国(我认为韩国是在东亚最接近俄罗斯的类似国家)来说,俄罗斯的国家所有权也并非不同寻常。与此同时,中国显然是政府主导程度最高的国家。



(8) One major thing to bear in mind is that while the SOE system have been criticized for producing monopolies, this is inaccurate:
As noted above, a deliberate feature of the SOE reforms of the 1990s was the creation of multiple, competing state firms even in sectors marked down for central control, such as aviation, telecoms, oil, and electricity generation. In less strategic industries the degree of state-sector fragmentation is even greater: in 2011, for instance, there were 880 SOEs in coal mining, 312 in steel, and 264 in nonferrous metals processing. …
One lesson from this experience is that, for countries making the transition from a socialist planned economy to a market economy, full privatization of state assets is not necessarily the critical step, as many economists believed in the 1990s. The indispensable feature of a market economy is not private property but competition. If state assets are privatized but competition mechanisms remain weak, the results will be poor: one just substitutes private monopolists or oligopolists for state-owned ones.
This is a very legitimate point. While China was carrying out intelligent reforms of its SOE sector, the US-worshipping market Bolsheviks in Russia were giving away the crown jewels of the Soviet economy to shady, well-connected characters. This just led to private monopolists replacing the public ones, with a new class of rapacious oligarchs thrown in for free. But at least the Communists didn’t get back into power in 1996 and that’s all that matters.



(10) Despite its status as a “bureaucratic-authoritarian” state (Kroeber’s descxtion), China is also one of the world’s most decentralized economies.
Interesting, this is a legacy of Maoist-era geostrategic concerns:
Decentralization of production partly resulted from China’s immense geographic diversity and its relatively poor transportation lixs. But it was also a deliberate strategy pursued by Mao Zedong, who believed that China’s best insurance against attack by the Soviet unx or the United States was a system that ensured that production of both daily necessities and military equipment could continue even if one or more major industrial area were wiped out.
… though today’s rationale is more purely political-economic:
Unlike Western analysts, who see a fatal contradiction between a dynamic economy and a tightly controlled political structure, Chinese leaders see the two as complementary. Tight political control provides the stability within which economic activity can be decentralized; and the resulting rapid economic growth in turn enhances the party’s legitimacy for having “delivered the goods” of higher living standards.

尽管中国是一个“官僚专制”的国家(mg电子游戏平台这样描述),但它也是世界上权力最分散的经济体之一。
有趣的是,这是毛时期地缘战略考量的遗留:
“分散生产的部分原因是中国巨大的地理多样性和相对较差的交通联系。但这也是刻意追求的战略,他相信中国抵御苏联或美国袭击的最好保障是,即使一个或多个主要工业区被摧毁,也能保证日常必需品和军事装备的生产能够继续。”

尽管今天的理由更纯粹是出于政治经济考虑:
不像西方分析人士认为的那样,充满活力的经济与受到严格控制的政治结构之间存在致命的矛盾。中国领导人则认为,两者是互补的。严格的政治控制提供了经济活动可以分散的稳定;由此带来的经济快速增长反过来又增强了中国GCD“提供更高生活水平的商品”的合法性。

(11) We don’t actually know China’s TFR – the SPFC claims ~1.6 children per woman, the Census hints at ~1.1. Amused to see Kroeber take a stab somewhere in the middle:

我们实际上并不知道中国的总生育率(略)

(12) But the really big demographics story in China is the great rural to urban migration, which Kroeber assess as ~2/3 done as of the time of writing. The World Bank estimates that the excess rural labor supply (i.e., workers not needed to maintain the present level of agricultural production) is somewhere around 100 million people. Accounting for future increases in agricultural productivity, somewhere around 120 to 135 million workers are likely to move from country to city between 2012 and 2030—in other words, about half as many as have already made the move. … An important footnote is that while worker migration to the cities will slow down, movement of nonworking family members to the city will probably pick up, as immigration restrictions are relaxed. This could add as many as 100 million more people to the migrant flow by 2030. At that point, China’s total urban population will be about 1 billion, or roughly 70 percent of the total population.
This syncs with my own tallies. Basically, China’s 2030 will be the RSFSR’s 1980 – the point at which the Russian urban population passed 70% of the total, to max out at 73% a decade later. By the middle of the 2030s, I expect a growing trickle of Central Asian Gastarbeiters rerouting to increasingly labor-starved Chinese cities (as they already are from Russia to South Korea).

但中国真正重要的人口统计数据是农村向城市的大规模移民,mg电子游戏平台估计,在撰写本文时,大约有2/3的人已经完成了这一过程。
“世界银行估计,农村过剩劳动力(也即是,不需要更多的劳动人数以维持现有农业生产水平)大约有1亿人。考虑到未来农业生产率的提高,2012年至2030年间,约有1.2亿至1.35亿工人可能会从农村迁往城市,换句话说,这一数字只有已经迁移了一半左右。一个重要的脚注是,尽管工人向城市迁移的速度将会放缓,但随着移民限制的放松,非工作家庭成员向城市迁移的速度可能会加快。到2030年,这将使流动人口增加1亿。届时,中国城市人口将达到10亿左右,约占总人口的70%。”

这和我自己的记录是一致的。基本上,2030年的中国将是1980年的俄罗斯,届时俄罗斯城市人口将超过总人口的70%,10年后将达到73%。我预计,到本世纪30年代中期,将有越来越多的中亚外籍工人改道到劳动力日益匮乏的中国城市(因为它们已经从俄罗斯迁至韩国)。

(13) Interesting to know that Ethiopia (my favorite African country) and Rwanda are the two fastest growing African countries, and the two African countries that have most closely adopted the Chinese model.
Justin Yifu Lin, who established China’s top economic think tank in the 1990s and served from 2008 to 2011 as chief economist of the World Bank, argues that African countries are in a good position to emulate China’s experience of economic development, using state-led infrastructure investment to attract FDI from companies (including Chinese ones) that no longer find China attractive as a site for low-cost manufacturing.19 Two African countries, Rwanda and Ethiopia, have adopted a more or less explicit policy of imitating the Chinese growth model. Over the past decade Ethiopia has been the fastest-growing economy in Africa, with an average GDP growth rate of 11 percent since 2004. Rwanda is not far behind, at 8 percent.
Despite some of the problems highlighted above, Kroeber is certainly no ideologue, and does highlight that life has become much better:
? While China allocates a prodigious amount of GDP to investment, people are still consuming more – consumer spending increased by 7% annually in 1990-2013.
? They have bought the most cars of any country since 2010, and make up the majority of the world’s international tourists since 2012.
? Labor conditions better than in comparable income countries. Child labor is not a major problem like in much of the Third World.
? Social spending is going up as Hu Jintao rebuilt the tattered safety net to replace the old SOE-based welfare system, including nationwide health insurance schemes, free schooling for nine years, and pension scheme coverage from 200 million to 700 million people.
Meanwhile, many problems that analysts cite as potential mines underneath Chinese economic progress are in reality fairly modest and manageable.
Low efficiency of current investments?
lixBookmark These are summed up in a motto frequently cited by one of China’s leading economists, Justin Lin, who attributes it to Premier Wen Jiabao: “When you multiply any problem by China’s population, it is a very big problem. But when you divide it by China’s population, it becomes very small.” … This observation illuminates a common feature of China’s economy in both the Maoist and reform eras: the main goal throughout has been to mobilize resources. Maximizing the efficiency with which those resources are used has always been a secondary concern. This often distresses economists from rich countries, where virtually all economic growth and improvement in living standards comes from efficiency improvements. Visitors to China observe the waste and inefficiency visible everywhere, and often conclude that the economy will soon hit a crisis. These predictions have so far been wrong, not because observers are wrong about the degree of waste, but because they fail to realize that in a country of China’s size, such waste can be irrelevant so long as it is a by-product of an effective process of meeting basic needs.



Nonetheless, Kroeber does later note that with China’s capital stock/GDP ratio approaching rich country levels, there will be diminishing returns from more capital investment. China will have to become more efficient about resource use.
Growth based on unsustainable currency manipulation?
A low exchange rate played some role in China’s export boom, but no more than a supporting one. From 2001 through 2010, when most experts agreed that China’s exchange rate was undervalued, China’s share of global manufactured exports rose by about 1.1 percentage points a year, from 5 percent to 15 percent. In 2010–2013, when China’s exchange rate appreciated rapidly and other costs such as wages were also rising, China still gained about 0.9 percentage points of global market share each year, to nearly 18 percent in 2013.
Degrading environment?
It is, however, worth putting China’s environmental challenges in international and historical perspective. Every country that has grown rich has gotten quite dirty along the way. Today the headlines are filled with stories about toxic smog in Chinese cities and chemical spills in Chinese rivers. It is easy to forget that four decades ago, almost identical headlines were being written about Japan; and that in the 1960s the United States faced severe air pollution problems in big cities like Pittsburgh and Los Angeles, rivers in industrial regions caught on fire, and localities were rendered unfit to inhabit because of chemical pollution.
Finally, nor is Kroeber unduly worried about Chinese debt. Mortgages are unlikely to be the trigger…
The average down payment for a home purchase in China is well over 30 percent and the legal minimum is 20 percent. On average, urban households carry debt that is less than 50 percent of their annual disposable income. This is a far cry from the United States, where down payments of 5 percent or less were common, and household debt peaked at nearly 130 percent of disposable income. This means that even if house prices fall quite a bit, Chinese homeowners will still have positive equity in their homes and will be able to continue paying off their mortgages. China is unlikely to suffer a housing-related financial crisis.

不过,mg电子游戏平台后来确实指出,随着中国的资本存量/GDP比率接近富裕国家的水平,更多资本mg电子游戏平台的回报将会递减。中国必须提高资源mg电子游戏平台效耺g电子游戏平台

基于不可持续的汇率操纵的增长?
“低汇率在中国出口繁荣中发挥了一定作用,但只是起到了支撑作用。从2001年到2010年,当大多数专家都认为中国的汇率被低估时,中国在mg电子游戏平台制造业出口中所占的份额每年上升约1.1个百分点,从5%上升到15%。2010年至2013年,中国汇率快速升值,工资等其他成本也在上升,但中国在mg电子游戏平台市场的份额仍以每年约0.9个百分点的速度增长,2013年达到近18%。”

艰苦的环境?
“确实是,然而值得从国际和历史的角度来看待中国面临的环境挑战。每个富裕起来的国家在发展过程中都变得相当肮脏。今天的头条新闻充斥着关于中国城市有毒烟雾和中国河流化学物质泄漏的报道。人们很容易忘记,40年前,几乎相同的头条新闻都是关于日本的;20世纪60年代,美国在匹兹堡和洛杉矶等大城市面临严重的空气污染问题,工业地区的河流着火,一些地方由于化学污染而变得不适合居住。”

最后,mg电子游戏平台也没有过度担心中国的债务。抵押贷款不太可能是导火索……
“在中国,买房的平均首付比例远远超过30%,法定最低首付比例为20%。平均而言,城市家庭背负的债务不到其年可支配收入的50%。这与美国的情况大不相同。在美国,首付不超过5%的情况很常见,家庭债务占可支配收入的比例达到了近130%的峰值。这意味着,即使房价大幅下跌,中国的房屋所有者仍将拥有正资产,并能够继续偿还抵押贷款。中国不太可能遭遇与房地产相关的金融危机。”

nor a sovereign debt crisis…
Whatever the level, however, a large and rapid increase in debt, such as we have seen in China since 2008, often does lead to financial crisis. But not necessarily. To have a crisis, you need two things: fast-rising debt, and a trigger event that forces shaky borrowers to pay up or go bankrupt. China has the debt, but not the trigger. The classic trigger for an emerging-market debt crisis is an inability to pay back foreign lenders. …
This is obviously not China’s problem. Its foreign borrowings are small—about 10 percent of GDP—and its gigantic foreign reserves of US$3.5 trillion (nearly 40 percent of GDP) give it plenty of ammunition to ward off a speculative attack and preserve the value of its currency. It runs an annual current account surplus of 2 to 3 percent of GDP, meaning that it has more than enough current income to cover its short-term foreign debts.
… nor from weird financial instruments…
The Financial Stability Board, an international group that monitors shadow banking around the world, found that for the entire world in 2013, nonbank assets accounted for 25 percent of all financial system assets, and were equivalent to 120 percent of world GDP. In the United States, nonbank assets accounted for nearly 60 percent of all financial assets, and equated to 150 percent of GDP. In China, nonbank assets were just 9 percent of financial assets, and a relatively modest 31 percent of GDP. … Second, China’s shadow finance is boring. Almost all of it consists of ordinary bank loans that are routed through nonbank institutions. Virtually all of the exotic features that make shadow banking both difficult to measure and potentially destabilizing in advanced countries are absent in China. China has basically no securitized loans, no derivatives, no collateralized debt obligations, no credit default swaps, few hedge funds and real estate investment trusts, and no structured finance vehicles.

也不太可能发生主权债务危机
“然而,无论债务水平如何,像2008年以来我们在中国看到的那样,债务的大幅快速增长往往会导致金融危机。但不一定。要发生危机,你需要两件事:快速增长的债务,以及迫使摇摇欲坠的借款人偿还债务或破产的触发事件。中国有债务,但不是导火索。新兴市场债务危机的典型诱因是无力偿还外国贷款。
这显然不是中国的问题。其外债仅占GDP的10%左右,其3.5万亿美元的巨额外汇储备(接近GDP的40%)为其提供了充足的弹药来抵御投机攻击,并保持其货币的价值。它的年度经常账户盈余占GDP的2%到3%,这意味着它有足够的经常收入来偿还短期外债。”

也不太可能来自怪异的金融工具
“负责监督mg电子游戏平台影子银行的国际组织金融稳定委员会(Financial Stability Board)发现,2013年mg电子游戏平台非银行资产占金融体系总资产的25%,相当于mg电子游戏平台GDP的120%。在美国,非银行资产占所有金融资产的近60%,相当于GDP的150%。在中国,非银行资产仅占金融资产的9%,占GDP的比例相对较低,为31%。其次,中国的影子金融令人生厌。几乎所有这些贷款都是通过非银行机构发放的普通银行贷款。实际上,所有让影子银行既难以衡量、又可能破坏发达国家稳定的奇特特征,在中国都没有。中mg电子游戏平台本上没有证券化贷款,没有衍生品,没有债务抵押债券,没有信用违约互换,几乎没有对冲基金和房地产mg电子游戏平台信托,也没有结构性金融工具。”



Corruption is certainly bad – though as I have argued with respect to Putin’s Russia, or Orban’s Hungary, is it even possible to maintain sovereignty from the Blue Empire without building up your own elite?
Profiteering from corruption ran right to the top of the political system. The biggest case that the government has acknowledged was that of Zhou Yongkang, who served on the Politburo standing committee in 2007–2012 and ran the nation’s security services. In 2014 Zhou was formally investigated for corruption and expelled from the party; police claimed to have confiscated assets of $14.5 billion from Zhou, his family members, and his business associates. That amount would rank Zhou as seventh in the list of China’s richest people compiled annually by the Shanghai-based Hurun Report. Foreign media have also documented extensive wealth in the immediate family of former prime minister Wen Jiabao (US$3 billion, according to the New York Times) and current president Xi Jinping (US$55 million in Hong Kong property, and investments in companies worth US$2 billion, according to Bloomberg News). The widespread perception that, in the party and government, no one’s hands are clean of corruption is probably accurate.

腐败当然是不好的——尽管正如我对普京领导的俄罗斯或欧尔班领导的匈牙利所持的看法一样,在不建立自己的精英阶层的情况下,是否有可能在西方面前维持主权?
(略)

In any case, Kroeber rightly points out that Chinese economy is dynamic enough to support significant corruption, and in any case, corruption has often served understandable political purposes, such as getting elite consensus for reforms, or purging hostile political factions.
Moreover, those people who steal too much & too flamboyantly do eventually get punished.
Finally, this tacit license to steal was not unlimited. Beginning in the early 1980s, the Communist Party waged a continuous and occasionally intense fight against corruption. … Researchers have found that at most one in ten corrupt officials are ever charged with corruption; but those that are charged are almost invariably convicted, and they face harsh sanctions including prison terms of ten years or more or even death sentences, of which 700 were handed down in corruption cases in the decade to 2008.
Finally, regional inequality is getting better:
By 2004, growth in rural consumption began to catch up to urban levels, and the urban-rural income gap began to shrink in 2009.6 As late as 2005, only a half-dozen provinces had urban wages within 10 percent of the national average. The rest of the country was divided between a handful of provinces, mainly on the coast, with much higher than average wages, and a vast mass of interior provinces with much lower incomes. By 2011 this provincial wage gap had closed: half of provinces had urban wages within 10 percent of the national average, and only the coastal megacities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai had wages more than 10 percent above the national norm.
So most likely we are not going to see George Friedman’s fevered predictions of the interior regions rising up against the fat cats in the coastal cities anytime soon.

无论如何,mg电子游戏平台正确地指出,中国经济的活力足以支持重大的腐败,而且无论如何,腐败往往为一些可以理解的政治目的服务,比如让精英阶层就改革mg电子游戏平台共识,或清除敌对的政治派别。
此外,那些偷太多和太浮夸的人最终会受到惩罚。

“最后,这种偷窃的默许并不是无限的。从上世纪80年代初开始,中国就开始了一场持续不断、时而激烈的反腐斗争。研究人员发现,多达十分之一的腐败官员曾被指控腐败;但那些被指控的人几乎无一例外地被定罪,他们面临着严厉的制裁,包括10年或更长时间的监禁,甚至死刑,其中700人是在截至2008年的10年间因腐败案件被判入狱的。”

最后,地区不平等正在改善。
“到2004年,农村消费增长开始赶上城市水平,城乡收入差距在2009年开始缩小,截止2005年,只有6个mg电子游戏平台份的城市工资水平低于全国平均水平的10%。中国其他地区被划分为少数mg电子游戏平台份(主要是沿海mg电子游戏平台份,工资远高于平均水平)和大量内陆mg电子游戏平台份(收入远低于平均水平)。到2011年,mg电子游戏平台份的工资差距已经缩小:一半的mg电子游戏平台份的城市工资水平低于全国平均水平的10%,只有北京、天津和上海等沿海大城市的工资水平高于全国平均水平的10%以上。”
因此,我们很可能不会看到George Friedman对内陆地区的狂热预测:在近期内与沿海城市的“肥猫”(fat cats)相抗衡。